Should the 76ers Trade Allen Iverson?

Many people believe that trading Philadelphia 76ers star guard Allen Iverson will be the best thing for the team. They point, loudly, repeatedly, intensely to a number of “reasons” as to why this is so. To that, there is one thing to say: Atlanta, Georgia. December 23, 2005. A game was both a foreshadowing and a microcosm for the entire season

During this game, Allen Iverson was unstoppable, scoring at will against any and every player the Hawks tried. He hit for 53 points on 17-31 shooting, a 55% clip far above his 45% rate for the year. He went 19-21 from the line. He even added 6 rebounds, 5 assists and 2 steals. Iverson had a great overall night. Meanwhile, Sixers 2nd year swingman Andre Iguodala had a neatly efficient complementary game, scoring 14 points on 5-8 shooting while adding 5 rebounds and 3 steals. This would sound like a recipe for success, especially against a young team like the Hawks.

Alas, their efforts were wasted as the 76ers lost 108-111 to the lowly Hawks. How did they lose, especially considering such a great game by their star? Two major reasons: 6-10 Forward Chris Webber and 6-7 Guard John Salmons. Webber, who scored 16 points but needed 21 shots to do it, spent most of the game, especially the fourth quarter, guarding Hawks center Zaza Pachulia, a run-of-the-mill big man who is only a starter because someone had to start for the Hawks. With Webber so afraid of Zaza’s “first step,” Pachulia hit repeatedly wide-open jump shots from the foul line area, finishing with 23 points. His 23 points, double his season’s average of 11.7 and more than triple his career average of 7.4, helped keep Atlanta in the game, along with guard Joe Johnson’s 24 and Forward Al Harrington’s 22.

The Sixers were still winning, however. With 3 minutes left, Iverson hit a driving lay-up that put Philadelphia up 105-104. Pachulia drew a foul on Webber, hitting both free throws to put Atlanta ahead by 1. Then, John Salmons “took over.” Salmons, who was left completely alone behind the arc for good reason, badly missed a three. On Atlanta’s ensuing possession, Pachulia drilled yet another jump shot in Webber’s face, making the score 108-105.

Salmons then drove into the teeth of the defense before being bailed out with a foul call. He hit 1 of 2 from the line. Joe Johnson responded with a jumper to make the score 110-106. Salmons, again left wide open, misfired on another 3. Philadelphia got a stop on the defensive end, which Salmons squandered by driving directly to shot blocker Josh Smith, getting his shot rejected with under a minute to go.

Fortunately, Iverson was able to get a steal, converting the turnover into a lay-up with 30 seconds left to make it a one-possession game. The 76ers got another stop, leading to a last opportunity to tie the game. The play was designed for Iverson, but Webber decided to take matters into his own hand, shooting an awkward jumper with 2 seconds left that missed badly. Atlanta got the rebound and that was the game.

Salmons shot 2-10 for the game, including 0-4 from deep. His repeated misfires helped Atlanta to steal the win. Then, in the locker room afterward, he had the audacity to cop an attitude and pout because of some of his teammates heckled his performance, probably, like many, wondering what he was thinking. In the beginning of the year, there were some who believed that Salmons could be a factor, enough that he could qualify for most improved. However, once teams figured out that he struggles going to his left and his post game is only successful against guards much smaller, his effectiveness went down hill. Not to mention his defensive skill tended to fluctuate with how many offensive touches he received. Fortunately, he is a free agent and most likely will be gone.

Webber did have a double double, also grabbing 11 rebounds, but his defense and Salmons arrogance conspired to make the Sixers lose the game. In this game and in many games during the year, Webber consistently failed to both guard his man straight up and rotate adequately on help defense. This helped to give many perimeter opponents a free escort to the basket once they beat their man. That was a big reason why the 76ers defense was so porous, being among the league leaders in dunks allowed. This doesn’t even factor in Webber’s offensive contribution, where he often puts up empty numbers
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Webber, a low-percentage volume shooter, required many shots to get his points, going 8-21 from the floor. Iguodala filled the sheet while shooting a very good percentage, going 5-8 from the field. People often refer to Iverson as a volume shooter, but the major difference between the two is that Iverson consistently blazes a path to the foul line. This fact again is exemplified by the Atlanta game, where Iverson shot 21 free throws while Webber missed his only 2 attempts. Iguodala, with 1/3rd of Webber’s shot attempts, went to the line 3 times as often, making 4.

Meanwhile, 6-6 sharp shooting forward Kyle Korver played 33 minutes but took only 4 shots, making 1, which was a three. This left a defensive liability playing big minutes without getting anything to show for it on the other end, something that Atlanta exposed by trying to isolate him repeatedly.

What can be learned from this game? That Allen Iverson is not the problem. This game scenario was often repeated during the year. The Sixers would have to try to outscore teams, because their defense, weakened by Webber and Korver both playing a lot of minutes while not playing any defense, could not stop anyone. Iverson, a 6-0 guard, would score big numbers on his way to setting a personal best scoring average of 33 points per game, taking 25 shots per game while converting at 45%, very respectable for a small guard. However, their offense was up and down, mainly due to Webber. He averaged 20.2 points but needed an average of 19 shots to get there, shooting 43%, a very low percentage for a big man.

Those shots mostly consisted of long elbow jumpers that produced long rebounds, which then created fast break chances for the other team. Webber rarely posted up or drove the lane. Whenever he did, he was often ineffective, displaying only a hit-and-miss right jump hook while avoiding contact.

Iverson, meanwhile, mostly attacked the lane and the midrange area. He also averaged 11.5 free throws per game, compared to Webber’s paltry 4.6 free throws per game. In fact, Webber averaged almost the same amount of free throws as Iguodala while taking almost triple the amount of shot attempts. Iguodala took 4.3 free throws per game while shooting only 8.4 shots per game from the floor, hitting 50% of his field goals tries on his way to scoring 12.3 per game.

The answer to the dilemma is then both simple and complex and consists of 3 parts. The first priority is to improve defensively by any means necessary. They took a major step during the draft with the selection of swingmen 6-6 Rodney Carney out of the University Memphis and 6-7 Bobby Jones from the University of Washington. Both are long, very quick, athletic players who pride themselves on shutting down their man. Carney, a former track star who also holds his team’s single season mark for three-point makes, can also shoot a little bit. This would allow the Sixers to make Korver into a sixth man, limiting his exposure and improve the defense, while giving them some firepower from the bench.
They still need to improve their rebounding, but so far so good.

The second part is an example of addition by subtraction: remove Chris Webber by any means necessary. The Sixers can do this by trade (Isiah? call on line one) or by coercing him into exercising his Early Termination Option or simply just buying him out., even if that means eating the $43 million he’s owed over the next 2 years.

Webber’s defensive ineptness often overshadowed just how inefficient and wasteful he was offensively. One of the often-used stats to highlight offensive efficiency is points-to-shots ratio. Holding a player close to a 1:1 ratio is considered good defense and/or bad offense, indicating that player is working way too hard to get points. In 36 of the 75 games Webber played, the number of shots he took either matched or exceeded his point total. That means he took as much or more shots than he scored points practically every other game last season. Compare that with Iverson, a notoriously high-volume rhythm shooter. Iverson’s shots attempted only matched or exceeded his points scored in just 7 games last season, the same amount of times Webber did it in November alone.

Another positive to removing Webber is that doing this would allow them to start both 7-0 Steven Hunter next to 6-11 Samuel Dalembert, presenting a very athletic “Twin Towers” look on defense. Both 76ers President and GM Billy King and Head Coach Maurice Cheeks have said they want to “change the culture of the team.” They insist that the team will be different next year, a return to the successful model embodied by the 2001 Finals squad: hard-working, blue-collar, intense, defense-first.

A lineup of the 6-0 Iverson, 6-6 Carney, 6-6 Iguodala, 7-0 Hunter and 6-11 Dalembert would be one of the more athletic combinations in the league and very similar to both units in 2001. The team that started the year 42-14 featured a lineup of 6-3 Eric Snow, Iverson, 6-8 George Lynch, 6-9 Tyrone Hill and 6-10 Ratliff. After Ratliff’s injury, they acquired 7-2 Dikembe Mutombo in a trade for Ratliff to help them get through the playoffs.

The 2006 squad would have the potential to be a true terror defensively, accumulating a lot of turnovers, blocks and long rebounds from bad shots. In addition, that lineup would have the speed advantage at every position on the court virtually every night, which would enable them to get a lot of fast break opportunities. The major difference between the 2001 teams and the 2006 version would be that the 2006 team would feature two back line erasers in Hunter and Dalembert, not just one in Ratliff. If they could also add a physical veteran leadership presence, an Alonzo Mourning or Marc Jackson or Malik Rose type player who can contribute while being a mentor and leader in the locker room, they would be in good shape.

Moreover, the third part would possibly make them even better. Both King and Cheeks have to sit down with Iguodala and tell him that he is riding shotgun next year and the season will make or break with him. He has to show that potential that he flashes only every so often, like during the Rookie Game and the 3 games after. His big problem is that he naturally deferred to the alphas on the team, both Iverson and Webber. He was also somewhat deferential to Korver, recognizing that unless Korver is scoring he has no real value on the floor due to his defense. However, in this scenario, Webber’s exit with Korver as a sniping sub would allow Iguodala to become more aggressive in demanding the ball, especially in the low post where he was successful against most opponents last season. Potentially, he could match Webber’s 20 per game while needing less shots to get there, allowing Carney to fill in his previous contribution, while having no slippage defensively.

Billy King has said he’s trying to make “a major move.” Hopefully, that move will feature the departure of Chris Webber, which could begin to trigger a return to the type of team that created the glory days of 2001. At the very least, that team with a couple minor tweaks should make the playoffs. Maybe the 76ers can go home again. Even still, there will be a lot of questions and issues, but at least they will have the Answer.

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